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Lessons from Sweden: Solidarity, the Welfare 
State, and Basic Income
alMaz zelleKe
NYU Shanghai
Progressive critics of a universal basic income argue that most 
nations face a budgetary choice between a full basic income and 
investment in public goods, including universal health care, free 
and well-funded education, and universal pensions, and have pri-
oritized a robust welfare state, or the "Swedish Model," over basic 
income. But examination of Swedish economic policy reveals that 
the welfare state is only one of the ingredients of the Swedish Model, 
and that another is an interventionist labor market policy unlikely 
to be expandable to larger states without Sweden's cultural and de-
mographic characteristics. Indeed, evidence suggests that Sweden's 
own recent diversification—not only of race and ethnicity but of 
occupational strata—will make the Swedish Model less stable in 
its own home. What lessons can be applied to the case for a basic 
income in the U.S. and other large and diverse nations or regions?
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Progressive critics of a basic income argue that govern-
ments should prioritize the public provision of goods and ser-
vices over a basic income, pointing to the Swedish welfare state 
in particular as a model for the U.S. to emulate. Late economist 
Barbara Bergmann (2002, 2006, 2008, 2014) was a prominent 
champion of the Swedish-style welfare state as an alternative 
to basic income. Sociologist Lane Kenworthy (2014) makes a 
similar argument in a book promoting the broader version 
of the Swedish Model that includes some of its labor market 
policies, in addition to extensive public provision of goods and 
services. Nicolas Colin and Bruno Palier (2015) argue in favor 
of a variant of the Swedish Model—Danish "flexicurity"—over 
basic income and guaranteed jobs in the face of a future of 
"lousy" jobs.
Bergmann, in particular, advocated a Swedish-style 
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welfare state, with publicly provided universal health care and 
childcare; high-quality, subsidized housing and college; 
and high spending on public transportation and schooling. 
Bergmann prioritized public provision over a generous basic 
income for three interrelated reasons, which can be character-
ized as budgetary, paternalistic, and feminist objections to a 
basic income. Bergmann argued that it would be impossible, 
or at the least, highly unlikely, for the U.S. to finance a basic 
income that would allow all to afford these goods on their own, 
regardless of how many children or special medical needs they 
had, and whether they were single parents or not (the budget-
ary objection). Even if the basic income were high enough, she 
argued, some recipients would spend their money on other 
things and not on what they ought to spend it on (the pater-
nalistic objection). And if a basic income were high enough to 
allow parents to support all their children, she feared that it 
would encourage women to withdraw from the labor force, 
and that would have negative effects for gender equality (the 
feminist objection). 
Kenworthy, while conceding that the idea of basic income 
has some merit, argues that a generous basic income would 
reduce employment and the tax base necessary to finance 
government functions, including those public goods that only 
government can provide—infrastructure, public safety, edu-
cation, and a strong safety net—and which should take pre-
cedence over the freedom-maximizing potential of a basic 
income. Colin and Palier argue that basic income seeks to 
replace the entrepreneurial, wage-based economy, while a 
generous in-kind welfare state complements it, by providing 
the cushion that makes the inevitable intermittent unemploy-
ment of a dynamic, innovating economy tolerable to workers.
These authors and many others point to the likely substan-
tial cost of a basic income and the significant political and eco-
nomic difficulties involved in moving a large, liberal market 
economy like the U.S.'s in the direction of a universal basic 
income, but they underestimate the difficulties of moving the 
U.S. in the direction of a Scandinavian welfare state. I have ad-
dressed several of these objections to a basic income elsewhere 
(Zelleke, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2015) and will not repeat those 
arguments. My aim in this essay is to examine the details of 
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the Swedish Model beyond the usual shorthand of generous 
public sector benefits and high taxes, to uncover other aspects 
of the model that might suggest whether and how it could be 
applied to larger and more diverse entities like the U.S. and the 
European Union. In fact, the Swedish Model has not expanded 
beyond its Nordic neighbors (with the possible exception of 
the Netherlands) and has been in retreat in Sweden itself since 
the 1980s. But the story of its development is a fascinating one, 
and suggests why the more explicit redistributionism of a basic 
income—exactly the thing that leads many skeptics to believe 
it couldn't possibly succeed in the U.S.—might in fact be the 
key that leads to a more durable and sustainable foundation 
for egalitarian welfare states than the Swedish Model.
The Nordic Context
While I focus in this article on Sweden, the paradigmat-
ic example of a comprehensive welfare state, Sweden shares 
many characteristics with the other Scandinavian, or Nordic 
states: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Iceland. The Nordic 
nations are consensual democracies, in which political activity 
aims to defuse conflict and achieve consensus (Hilson, 2008). 
The goals of consensus and compromise are facilitated by his-
torical, cultural, and socio-economic features of the Nordic 
region, including their histories of constitutional monarchy 
and parliamentary democracy (except for Finland), their lack 
of serfdom, their late but swift industrialization, their small 
size1, and their overwhelming religious homogeneity2. Their 
geographic location between continental Europe and the 
former Soviet Union (excluding Iceland) embodies their search 
for a "third way" between capitalism and communism, and the 
confluence of interests between workers and small farmers 
facilitated the political compromises between these groups 
and capitalists in the formation of their political economies in 
the first half of the 20th century (Hilson, 2008). Thus, while 
the Nordic states are now hailed as among the most egalitar-
ian in the world, and credit for this fact is implicitly ascribed 
to their welfare state institutions and policies, their histories 
and culture reveal that their welfare states evolved from more 
egalitarian, less socially fragmented starting points at the 
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beginning of the 20th century than either their continental 
neighbors to the south, including Germany and France, or the 
U.K. and U.S. further away.
The Swedish Model
The Swedish Model is often characterized as a compre-
hensive welfare state with a strong commitment to full em-
ployment for all its members. While this is accurate, a closer 
examination demonstrates that the Swedish Model involves 
more than that, including political and economic policies that 
are usually overlooked. There are four crucial elements to the 
Swedish Model, but references to the Swedish Model tend 
to emphasize only two of them: benefit programs, including 
public provision of goods and services and cash benefits; and 
the tax regime necessary to finance them. Equally important 
not only to the success but to the very existence of the Swedish 
Model are its system of market regulation, and the cultural 
and demographic factors that provide the foundational mate-
rial of its political and economic institutions and delimit the 
policy options available to politicians and voters. A closer look 
at all these factors suggests that if the Swedish welfare state is 
the goal, a basic income may not only not be an obstacle, but a 
necessary step to its achievement.
Cultural, Historical, and Demographic Factors
The cultural and religious homogeneity of Sweden during 
the development if its welfare state, along with its small popu-
lation, are well known, but it is instructive to explore these 
demographic markers in detail. Sweden has fewer than 10 
million people; in comparison, the U.S. has over 300 million 
people, the U.K., France, Germany, Italy and Spain have 
between 40 and 90 million, and the European Union as a 
whole has 500 million. Religious affiliation rates are declining 
everywhere, but the Lutheran Church of Sweden—until 2000 
the state church—claims 70% of the population as members. 
In contrast, Protestants of all denominations make up only 
50% of the U.S. population; Germany has roughly the same 
numbers of Catholics and Protestants, with each making 
up about 30% of the population; and French Christians, the 
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majority of whom are Catholic, make up only about half of the 
population. More importantly, at the turn of the 20th century 
when the foundations of the contemporary Swedish welfare 
state were laid, Lutheran affiliation in Sweden would have 
been almost universal.
The Church of Sweden was founded in the 16th century, 
and the lack of competing denominations during the develop-
ment of Swedish democracy had significant political and social 
implications. The unchallenged supremacy of the Lutheran 
church obviated the need for religiously-aligned political 
parties, leading to a secularism in its political culture that dis-
tinguishes it from some of its larger European neighbors to the 
south. It also led to a fusion of church and state priorities in line 
with Lutheran egalitarianism, which is based on the idea of "a 
priesthood of all believers," as opposed to a clerical hierarchy, 
and which could not coexist with large and visible inequali-
ties of wealth and power (Thorkildsen, 1997). In the context of 
Lutheranism's emphasis on daily work and the maintenance of 
order, unemployment is not only a social or economic problem 
but, in the words of historians Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth, 
"almost a sin" (Sørensen & Stråth, 1997, p. 13). In other words, 
it is not only Sweden's homogeneity, but its particularly 
Lutheran homogeneity, that formed the background to the 
development of its solidaristic and egalitarian welfare state, 
leading some analysts of Nordic social democracy to go so far 
as to characterize it as "secularized Lutheranism" (Østergård 
1997, p. 69; see also Sørensen & Stråth, 1997).
On the political front, Sweden enjoyed a relatively peaceful 
transition from absolute monarchy to democracy, in contrast to 
France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. Aristocratic privileges 
in 19th century Sweden were focused on access to civil service 
positions—positions in service to the nation—rather than on 
large landholdings (Tsarouhas, 2008). Sweden's agricultural 
sector was made up of a mix of large and small farmers, rather 
than serfs and lords, and its freeholding peasants form the core 
of the mythical Swedish folk—the idealization of the common 
man in Swedish society that played a large part in the devel-
opment of Swedish social democracy (Berman 2006; Sørensen 
& Stråth, 1997; Tsarouhas, 2008). Peasants enjoyed represen-
tation in the Diet from the 15th century until estate-based 
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representation was replaced in the 19th century by electoral 
representation (Sørensen & Stråth, 1997; Kaufmann, 2013). 
This history has two important legacies. First, the existence 
of a large and politically recognized agricultural sector bal-
anced the voice of labor in the industrial sector that developed 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, causing the govern-
ment to develop benefit programs in a universal, rather than 
strictly laborist fashion (Gustafsson, 2008). For example, as 
pensions for the elderly were debated in the first decades of 
the 20th century, the coalition between agrarian and proletari-
at parties led to the rejection of the Bismarckian worker-centric 
pension model in favor of one that covered the entire popula-
tion (Kaufmann, 2013)3. Second, the state's own reformist ten-
dencies obviated the need for revolutionary struggle against 
the state, fostering the country's consensualist political tradi-
tion (Trägård, 1997).
Political scientist Lars Trägård calls Sweden an "associative 
democracy" because of its tradition of using local parish coun-
cils and stakeholder input to study and come to consensus on 
social and economic matters (Trägård, 2007). For example, from 
the late 19th century on, local labor exchanges were run jointly 
by unions, employers, and local officials, and government com-
missions made up of different stakeholders continue to play 
a large role in Swedish policy making (Rothstein & Trägård, 
2007; Trägård, 2007). This characterization should not obscure 
the political and economic unrest faced by Sweden in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries. Despite (or because of) a strong 
union movement linked with the birth of the Social Democratic 
Party (the Sveriges Arbetarparti, or SAP) in 1889, Sweden suf-
fered from significant labor unrest and became known as the 
"strike capital" of the Western world (Berman, 1998, p. 43; 
Micheletti, 1995, pp. 46-49). Nevertheless, its Lutheran orien-
tation toward work, its generally benign state apparatus, and 
its small scale—which facilitated the development in 1898 of 
the federation of unions called the Landsorganisationen (LO), 
followed four years later by the federation of employers, the 
Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen (SAF)—set Sweden on a par-
ticular path of compromise, moderation, and consensus that 
dominated Swedish politics for three quarters of a century. In 
Rothstein and Trägård's (2007) words, 
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To speak in the language of contemporary historical 
institutionalism, a series of relatively small and 
contingent events, occurring at a very early point in 
the process of modernization and democratization, 
produced large consequences. The success of early 
democratic neocorporatism set Sweden on a particular 
path of institution making when it came to state-civil 
society relations. Subsequent successes produced, in 
Paul Pierson's language, "increasing returns," further 
strengthening these institutional arrangements. (p. 249)
Market Regulation
The story of Sweden's high levels of unionization and the 
political dominance of SAP are often told, suggesting that a 
strong labor movement and a successful and sympathetic polit-
ical party are the keys to the Swedish Model, but this narrative 
omits the critical part played by Sweden's distinctive system of 
market regulation in the development of the Swedish model. 
Several milestones in the development of the Swedish system 
of market regulation are worth recounting.
The existence of the labor and employers' federations, 
along with a pragmatic, rather than ideologically rigid 
workers' party in SAP—which would begin an unparalleled 
40-year period in government in the 1930s—set the stage for 
the broad-based coordination of economic policy that became 
the defining feature of the Swedish Model in the first half of 
the 20th century. LO's close relationship with SAP, along with 
SAP's strategic decision to broaden its identity from a workers' 
party to a people's party, strengthened the hand of the labor 
movement in its negotiations with employers—to a point. 
Nevertheless, the early years of the 20th century saw a high 
level of labor strife. In the 1906 "December Compromise," LO 
and SAF came to the first of a series of landmark agreements, 
with LO recognizing employers' rights to run their companies 
in exchange for the unions' rights to organize and bargain col-
lectively (Tsarouhas, 2008, p. 43). This negotiation signaled a 
disagreement between LO and SAF—over labor's part in the 
management of firms—that was to re-emerge more than once 
in the following decades.
Nineteen-thirties Sweden saw the highest level of labor 
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unrest of any nation (Standing, 1988) and attempts by the 
government to intervene. Instead, LO and SAF agreed to ne-
gotiate wages and work conditions independently of the gov-
ernment. Named for the town in which it was negotiated, the 
Saltsjöbaden Agreement of 1938 began a period of bilateral ne-
gotiation between labor and capital that was to last until the 
1970s. The agreement contained the seeds of the centralized 
bargaining between unions and employers that was to come in 
the 1950s (Högfeldt, 2005), but it also represented the failure of 
LO's efforts, for a second time, to win German-style labor rep-
resentation in firm management (Tsarouhas, 2008). Political 
scientist Michele Micheletti (1995, p. 63) calls it the beginning 
of the "labor market cold war" that lasted until détente col-
lapsed in the 1970s.
The Saltsjöbaden Agreement was followed in 1944 by the 
SAP-led government's expressed commitment to promoting 
full employment, defined as frictional unemployment of only 
2%. This was to be achieved by stimulating private investment, 
socializing consumption, and an active labor market policy—
helping workers to transition from failing to rising industries 
and firms (Standing, 1988). Then, in 1951, two LO economists 
developed what came to be known as the Rehn-Meidner 
model. The Rehn-Meidner model addressed the dilemma of 
how to achieve full employment without creating unmanage-
able inflation, which neither labor nor capital wanted. The so-
lution to this dilemma was a negotiated compression of the 
wage scale, with equal pay for equal work set at a high level, 
regardless of the profitability of the individual firm. This soli-
daristic wage policy moderated wage differentials and wage 
increases, reducing financial incentives for workers to jump 
from firm to firm in search of higher wages. Wage compres-
sion hastened structural adjustment by forcing unproductive 
firms that could not afford the effective minimum wage out 
of business. The model also endorsed the government's adop-
tion of an active labor market policy to retrain and redeploy 
workers from failing firms, and from regions with few jobs to 
the cities where jobs were available.4 The Rehn-Meidner model 
set the stage for the SAF's invitation to LO to begin central-
ized labor negotiations at the industry, rather than firm level, 
in 1952.
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The Rehn-Meidner model sought to manage the labor 
market in favor of high, stable wages for its members, while 
sacrificing potentially larger gains for some workers in the in-
terests of the stability of the entire system. Is such a strategy 
the cause or the effect of social solidarity? It is likely to have 
been both—possible because of the shared interests of mostly 
male industrial workers in the "Golden Age" of strong, post-
war growth, and reinforcing of their solidarity as long as it 
was seen as contributing to continued growth. It is important 
to note as well, however, that the Rehn-Meidner model once 
again signaled labor's acquiescence, at least for the time being, 
in a capitalist economy with a high concentration of private 
ownership and management of capital (Tsarouhas, 2008).5 
As will be discussed below, the unresolved tension under-
lying these agreements remained submerged only until the 
1970s, when cultural, demographic, and economic changes 
undermined the conditions that made them possible. But first, 
it is instructive to compare the timeline of the development 
of the benefit programs we think of as central to the Swedish 
Model to that of the system of labor market regulation that is 
sometimes left out of references to the model.
Development of the Swedish Welfare State
This remarkable set of agreements on labor market regula-
tion between employers, labor, and the government coincided 
with the development of the welfare state programs charac-
teristic of the Swedish Model. In 1913, Sweden established the 
first universal pension, comprised by a social insurance system 
of pension benefits financed by contributions, to be phased-in 
for current workers, and a system of need-based, means-test-
ed pensions, which immediately covered all elderly poor, re-
gardless of whether their employment was in the agricultural 
or industrial sector (Hagen, 2013). This dual system evolved 
into a universal, flat "people's pension" after WWII, in 1946, 
with benefits no longer means-tested or linked to contribution 
levels (Hagen, 2013, pp. 31-33; see also Kaufmann, 2013, pp. 
128-129; and Tsarouhas, 2008, pp. 51-52).
The next phase of development was in the period around 
WWII, and centered on policies to raise the birth rate, includ-
ing marriage loans and maternity relief to help the poor finance 
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family life, introduced in 1937 (Trägård, 1997), followed by 
universal child benefits in 1948. Universal health insurance 
was introduced in 1955, providing access to private health 
care providers for all Swedes; in 1968, the medical system was 
largely socialized, with health care providers becoming state 
employees.
At the height of the Golden Age, with rising post-war wages 
leading to concerns about the adequacy of the flat "people's 
pension," a supplementary system of contributory pensions 
was restored, securing a pension of 60% of average income 
during the 15 highest earning years for those who had worked 
for at least 30 years (Hagen, 2013, pp. 38-43). In 1965, the 
"million homes" affordable housing program was established 
to address the shortage of decent housing in Swedish cities and 
to reduce the costs of labor mobility. Maternity benefits were 
introduced in 1962, were later extended to fathers as well, and 
were increased again in the 1970s, and state-subsidized child-
care, first established in the 1960s, was greatly expanded in 
the early 1970s. Together with the switch from joint to indi-
vidual taxation of couples in 1971, Sweden's generous paren-
tal benefits—available only to those who are employed—has 
given it one of the highest female labor participation rates in 
the world, with an employment rate for working-age women 
of 74% in 2015. (Only Iceland's and Switzerland's rates—82% 
and 76% in 2015, respectively—are consistently higher than 
Sweden's. In comparison, the 2015 rate for U.S. women was 
63% [OECD, 2016a].)
Prior to WWII, unemployment benefits were financed and 
administered by the unions, but state subsidies to the plans 
began in the 1930s and grew rapidly after the war. In 1974, 
employers were required to contribute, and in 1979 the system 
was extended to all workers, financed by payroll taxes and 
administered by the unions. The 1970s also saw the expan-
sion of public sector employment in Sweden, which coin-
cided with the entry of women into the employment sector 
in large numbers; public sector employment accounted for 
almost 40% of Swedish women's labor participation in 1970 
(Flanagan,1987, p. 128), reached a high of about 60%, and 
now, after a period of budget cuts, accounts for roughly 50%, 
compared to 20% for men (Statistics Sweden, 2012, p. 59). As a 
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result of its active labor market policies and large public sector, 
Sweden has among the highest employment rates in the de-
veloped world, at 75% in 2015, compared to 69% in the U.S. 
(OECD, 2016a).
To summarize, prior to WWII, the Swedish welfare state 
included only need-based pensions and the beginnings of con-
tributory pensions, and union-run unemployment insurance. 
At that time, it was closer to a social insurance and residualist 
social assistance model than to the more universalistic model 
it developed into in the prosperous post-war period (Hilson, 
2008). After the war, universal health care, pensions, and chil-
dren's allowances were implemented, followed by active labor 
market policies in the 1950s and 1960s to support the three-way 
consensus by labor, capital, and the government to pursue full 
(male) employment while moderating inflationary pressures 
through a solidaristic wage policy. Public day care and paren-
tal leave policies, first implemented in the 1960s, expanded 
in the early 1970s and, together with the shift in tax policy, 
encouraged women to enter the work force in large numbers, 
leading to Sweden's reputation as a highly gender-egalitarian 
universalist welfare state.6 However, it was when the Swedish 
welfare state shifted from a social insurance model based on a 
male-breadwinner to a universalist model with a goal of male 
and female full employment that the Swedish Model began its 
decline.
Challenges to the Swedish Model
The 1970s brought a number of challenges to the Swedish 
political economy. Some disruptions were felt by other ad-
vanced economies, including the oil shocks, women's in-
creasing demands for equality and economic opportunity, 
and the transition to a post-industrial economy. Some of the 
most important challenges to the Swedish model were in-
ternal, however. LO—a male-dominated, blue-collar union 
federation—reacted to the economic disruptions by shifting 
from a strategy of labor market security, in which employ-
ment, but not particular jobs, is protected, to one of employ-
ment security, in which employees were protected from losing 
the jobs they held. In the face of the decreasing importance 
of manufacturing to the economy, LO abandoned its former 
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commitment to equal pay for equal work in favor of a more 
general commitment to equality of wages, a less tenable goal 
in a post-industrial economy characterized by increasing au-
tomation, a growing public sector, and the rise of the knowl-
edge worker. In addition, the government retreated from its 
post-war policy of allowing structural adjustment to occur on 
its own and adopted a more interventionist economic policy, 
subsidizing failing firms in the hopes of having them emerge 
from what were viewed as cyclical downturns (Hilson, 2008; 
Standing, 1988).
Finally, both LO and their SAP allies abandoned their 
agreement with employers to leave labor market regulation to 
negotiations between unions and employers, legislating regu-
lations to make employment more secure. Legislation enacted 
in the 1970s created seniority protections and made it much 
harder to dismiss employees, and mandated the board repre-
sentation and input into work rules LO had long sought for 
the unions, though management remained in control of firm 
decisions (Högfeldt, 2005, pp. 545, 552). In 1976, LO sought 
legislation to create "Wage Earner Funds" designed to capture 
some of the profits earned by the most profitable firms, which 
benefited from LO's imposition of wage restraint on their 
workers. The plan was to transfer a portion of firm profits to 
the collective ownership of firm employees up to a small ma-
jority—52%—of shares over time. The attempted legislation 
of Wage Earner Funds was seen by SAF as a violation of the 
agreement to negotiate independently of government, not to 
mention of the underlying bargain around a form of regulated 
capitalism, rather than socialism (Meidner, 1993; Standing, 
1988, pp. 139-144). Furthermore, the plan failed to generate 
widespread popular support since it was limited to industrial 
workers in the most competitive firms (Tsarouhas, 2008).7 SAF 
withdrew from centralized bargaining in 1983.
This breakdown in the system of labor market regulation 
can be attributed to strategic missteps by LO and SAP, or to 
secular changes in global economic conditions over which 
the Swedes had little control, but they expose the underly-
ing instability of the bargain made between labor, capital, 
and government in the earlier decades of the 20th century. 
As LO Economist Rufolf Meidner, one of the architects of the 
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Rehn-Meidner model, notes, the solidaristic wage policy was 
unable to meet the challenges of the post-industrial economy, 
as LO failed to maintain consensus around wage differentials 
for different kinds of work (Meidner, 1993).8 More important-
ly, the halo around the Swedish model obscures the opposi-
tion of employers during its development. Throughout the 
20th century, Swedish employers resisted many of the moves 
to make the welfare state universalistic, rather than status-spe-
cific. While employers were defeated in the post-war Golden 
Age, when Sweden and the rest of Europe reaped the benefits 
of peace and reconstruction in the form of robust economies, 
LO and the SAP leadership of the 1970s (when Olof Palme was 
prime minister) seem to have underestimated the opposition 
by owners of capital to their ultimate goal of not only politi-
cal and social democracy, but economic democracy as well 
(Högfeldt, 2005).
According to economist Peter Högfeldt, SAP's longstand-
ing bargain with Sweden's capitalists was predicated not only 
on maintaining capitalist control of Swedish industry, but on 
maintaining a particularly concentrated form of ownership that 
brought stability and predictability to the Swedish economy. 
Throughout the 20th century, SAP policies in banking and tax-
ation reinforced capital concentration among a small group of 
owners and a stable group of large, export-oriented "national 
champions," as opposed to encouraging broad distribution of 
capital and disruptive entrepreneurship (Högfeldt, 2005, p. 
542). According to political scientist Michele Micheletti, the 
period of cooperation between LO and SAF rested on their 
agreement on shared means of full employment, low infla-
tion, and economic restructuring in support of divergent 
goals—of promoting high standards of living for workers, in 
LO's case, and of promoting international competitiveness, for 
SAF. When changing economic circumstances called for dif-
ferent means, their underlying differences came to the fore 
(Micheletti, 1995).
Full employment remains a goal of Swedish economic 
policy, and work incentives remain strong given the high tax 
rates that reduce take-home pay, but protective employment 
regulations make shirking and absenteeism a problem for em-
ployers. Full employment has proved elusive since the 1970s, 
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and has given way to increasing labor market segmentation 
between those with full-time work and part-time workers 
who want more hours, and between those in protected jobs 
and those in active labor market programs (Gustafsson, 2008). 
Young adults, immigrants, and older workers are increasingly 
relegated to training programs and involuntary early retire-
ment, artificially lowering the official unemployment rate—
currently 8%—according to skeptics (OECD, 2016b). Active 
labor market programs reflect the continuing commitment of 
the government and society to the goal of full employment, 
but they look increasingly like substitutes for jobs, rather than 
transitions to them.
Full employment is critical to the Swedish Model for two 
reasons. The high cost of the welfare state requires high taxes 
to finance it—taxes that come predominantly from income 
taxes, rather than other sources, like corporate or wealth taxes. 
This tax structure requires a broad base of workers, particular-
ly with the aging population Sweden shares with its European 
neighbors. Second, the social solidarity underlying the univer-
salism of the welfare state is inextricable from the full partici-
pation of Swedes in making the welfare state possible. A strong 
norm of reciprocity is the foundation of the model, and it is 
difficult to see how the universalistic welfare state—already 
under retrenchment in the face of a less robust economy—sur-
vives without it. Sweden's welfare state has in the last 20 years 
moved in the direction of stricter guidelines for eligibility 
and lower income replacement rates—away, that is, from the 
welfare state's "equality of the highest standards," in Esping-
Andersen's words (1990, p. 27), and toward more modest ben-
efits and small steps toward privatization in schools, pension 
funds, and healthcare—including school vouchers and partial 
privatization of the government pension system, which even 
Republican President George W. Bush failed to enact in the 
U.S.
The Swedish Model in its heyday combined the goals of 
full employment, economic growth, and social and economic 
equality. The model was supported by cultural and historical 
factors unique to Sweden and its Nordic neighbors, including 
their small size, Lutheran homogeneity, and the trajectories of 
their industrialization processes, but it was achieved through 
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the ability and willingness of its major economic and political 
groups to compromise and create a consensus for socialization 
of income and consumption, concentration of private owner-
ship of capital, regulation of markets, stability, and the subli-
mation of individual economic ambition for the greater good. 
The Swedish Model has proven adaptable, with elements of 
the bargain reassessed and revised as economic circumstances 
warrant. It remains to be seen how much adaptation in the di-
rection of a more liberal welfare regime the Swedish Model 
can absorb while retaining its universalistic distinction.
Lessons from Sweden
I began this essay by suggesting that the Swedish Model 
includes more than just generous and universalistic benefit 
programs and the high taxes that pay for them. As described 
above, the background conditions of the model that emerged 
in 20th century Sweden include a small, homogeneously 
Lutheran population; a largely independent and politically re-
spected agricultural sector; a consensualist political tradition 
built on a reformist, rather than revolutionary, evolution to de-
mocracy; a parliamentary form of government; consensualist 
and coordinated economic policy; and high levels of unioniza-
tion. For a political theorist, the emphasis on consensus in the 
Swedish Model—whether on coordination of the labor market, 
as Meidner (1993) describes, or on universalism in benefits 
and labor force participation, as Pontussen (2011) describes—
evokes nothing so much as the social contract theory of French 
philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. As political scientist Lars 
Trägård notes, Scandinavian political culture is democratic, 
not liberal—marked by centralized power, uniformity, and an 
inclusive, participatory democracy through which the "general 
will" can be uncovered and implemented. The Swedish citizen 
is, he argues, "perfectly independent of all his fellow citizens 
and excessively dependent on the republic" (Trägård, 1997, p. 
261.) Historian Henrik Stenius characterizes the Nordic form 
of democracy similarly, not as a balancing of opposing inter-
ests, but as a quest to express the true interests of the people, 
and founded on the belief that "a people is happy when it can 
pass laws on its own and then make a commitment to obey 
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them" (Stenius, 1997, p. 170).
This Rousseauian characterization of Nordic political 
culture suggests the limits of its applicability as a model for 
emulation elsewhere. As Stenius notes, 
In Southern Europe the concept of citizenship meant 
that each individual had the same relation to the 
state despite the diversity in their ethnicity and social 
standing. In the Nordic countries, individuals were 
citizens because people were similar to each other 
socially, ethnically, and religiously. (1997, p. 167) 
Perhaps, then, it should come as no surprise that the Swedish 
Model has not been widely emulated in Europe. In fact, since 
the 1990s, while the country has attempted to maintain the 
core commitments to full employment, active labor market 
policies, and universal health care, pensions, and childcare, 
the Swedish welfare state has moved more in the direction of 
reducing benefits than Europe has moved toward embracing 
the Swedish Model (Kaufmann, 2013).
Could the Swedish Model be adapted to a large and 
diverse liberal state, like the U.S.? In other words, is it possible 
to transplant some elements of the Swedish Model to a nation 
with a different cultural and demographic profile? Certainly, 
other European nations with larger and more diverse popula-
tions than the Nordic nations have managed to provide uni-
versal healthcare and education, child allowances, and good 
public infrastructure to their citizens without Sweden's bilat-
eral labor negotiations or solidaristic wage policy, but they 
have done so in conjunction with other kinds of coordinated 
labor and economic policy—a very inflexible labor market (in 
the case of France) or firm-level co-determination (in the case 
of Germany), for example. Few European nations have univer-
sal childcare, though, a crucial factor in Sweden's high female 
labor force participation rate, both on the supply side (making 
work possible for mothers) and the demand side (making jobs 
available for women). In other words, while the level of social 
provision in Europe may be generally higher than it is in the 
U.S., the particular mix of benefits, labor policies, and market 
regulations reflect cultural and national differences in priori-
ties, strategies, and goals, and add up to different packages in 
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each nation. Critical elements of the Swedish Model are not 
only missing from the U.S. context but incompatible with its 
liberal market economy and political separation of powers. 
The U.S. lacks both a strong commitment to full-employment 
and a consensus in favor of an expensive welfare state, it sub-
stitutes the "wage discipline" of unemployment for self-mod-
eration in wage demands by the labor sector, and it lacks (and 
in some cases legally prohibits) the consensual cooperation of 
unified labor, capital, and political actors on wages rates and 
industrial policy.
Since the publication of Thomas Piketty's Capitalism in the 
Twenty-First Century (2014), it is hard to escape the sense that 
all employment-based welfare states are as exceptional as the 
Swedish welfare state. As his data suggests, their development 
coincided with an extraordinary period in economic history 
during which economic returns from capital were at historic 
lows and economic returns to employment were at historic 
highs. While the Swedish welfare state succeeded in socializ-
ing employment income through its full employment and soli-
daristic wage policies and socializing consumption through 
its provision of public goods, it did little better than other 
European states at durably socializing capital (Piketty, 2014, 
pp. 344-347)9, and indeed seems deliberately to have chosen 
not to socialize capital, much to the chagrin of the labor move-
ment. If we are now in a period of declining returns to employ-
ment and increasing returns to capital, as Piketty suggests, the 
Swedish Model, however attainable it might or might not be 
by other nations or regions, may have outlived its usefulness 
as a model for other nations to emulate.
Lessons for the U.S.
It goes without saying that the adoption of a Swedish-style 
welfare state would herald a marked improvement in the lives 
of millions of Americans who live in poverty, who face repeat-
ed and extended bouts of unemployment, who remain unin-
sured despite the passage of "Obamacare," and who struggle 
to find and afford the childcare that would make holding on to 
low-wage jobs easier. But given the cultural and demographic 
foundations of the Swedish Model, is it plausible to expect the 
adoption of that kind of welfare state in the U.S.? If so, given 
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that we are in the realm of fairly utopian thinking anyway, 
might we be more ambitious?
To the first question, it is clear that the U.S. has a very dif-
ferent cultural, historical, and political context than Sweden: 
a population 30 times its size; racial, ethnic, and religious di-
versity far beyond that in Sweden; a federalist, presidential 
political structure designed by our founders to foster compe-
tition, rather than a centralized, parliamentary government 
designed to foster compromise; less trust in government and 
collective action, and more faith in individual initiative and 
achievement due to our revolutionary history and to waves of 
immigration of groups persecuted and marginalized by their 
former governments; and the pernicious legacy of slavery. 
Slavery's legacy is multifaceted, and has not only marked 
African-Americans for continuing violence, theft, disenfran-
chisement, and discrimination, but has contributed to the de-
velopment of American political and economic institutions in 
ways that make the expansion of the welfare state much more 
difficult than in European nations. Not only did the institu-
tion of slavery create an early and enduring division between 
the economies of the northern and southern states, it was only 
dismantled through a brutal and devastating civil war, the 
outcome of which, it is fair to say, has not been fully accepted 
by the losing side. The argument that the kind of reciprocity 
between labor and capital embodied in the Swedish Model is 
a strong value in the U.S. can only be made in willful disre-
gard of the continuing economic and political subjugation of 
African-Americans (not to mention the immigrants from Latin 
America who are the foundation of our agricultural sector) 150 
years after the end of slavery.
Even setting aside the question of race in theory—im-
possible as it would be in practice—the forms of consensus 
around economic issues that underlie the Swedish Model are, 
quite simply, entirely absent in the U.S. Instead of a consen-
sus around egalitarianism and a regulated market, our found-
ing mythology centers on a natural aristocracy of merit, free 
markets, and negative liberty, rather than a Rousseauian posi-
tive liberty. We never had anywhere near the degree of union-
ization in the U.S. that Sweden enjoys,10 nor do we have the 
stable concentration of capital ownership that Sweden has, 
Sept.2016.indd   90 8/5/16   1:06 PM
91
or the parliamentary political system that would foster the 
creation and durability of a consensus around these important 
issues.
When we examine the welfare state the U.S. was able to in-
stitutionalize in the 20th century, we can compare the nation's 
success at providing universalistic benefits through public 
provision and through cash. The benefits we provide in kind—
public primary and secondary schooling, and low-income 
housing—were deliberately segregated by race at the outset, 
and remain largely segregated today, despite the outlawing of 
outright racial segregation, through economic and residential 
segregation. In addition, the federal government's expansion 
of Medicaid—federally-funded, but state-implemented health 
care for low-income Americans—continues to be resisted by 
19 states, including most of the states in the old slaveholding 
south that continue to have large African-American popula-
tions. Welfare state institutions in the U.S. that are adminis-
tered by the states are often administered in discriminatory 
and unequal ways. Could we expect public provision of child-
care to be any different?
If we look at cash benefits, it is true that in the case of Social 
Security, our federally-implemented contributory old-age 
pension, African-Americans were excluded from participation 
through limitations on the employment covered by the Social 
Security Act of 1935; at the time, African-Americans were dis-
proportionately employed in agriculture and domestic em-
ployment, and those two industries were excluded as part 
of the compromise with southern Senators necessary for the 
act's passage. By 1954, however, the Act had been amended 
to include those two industries—partly to expand the base 
of contributors to pay for the pay-as-you-go benefits—with 
the result that African-Americans are now included in Social 
Security on exactly the same terms as white Americans. In the 
words of political scientist Robert C. Lieberman, it was ironic 
that "the exclusionary Old-Age Insurance program of 1935 
became, by the 1960s, perhaps the closest thing to a race-blind 
social program the United States has ever known" (Lieberman, 
1998, p. 67).11 
While we lose a sense of solidarity due to our large size, 
our diverse population, and our federal and presidential 
Lessons from Sweden
Sept.2016.indd   91 8/5/16   1:06 PM
political system, the example of Social Security shows that 
when a universalistic, national cash transfer program is 
enacted, it can overcome our legacy of racial discrimination 
to generate an egalitarian program with political durability 
unmatched, apparently, even by elements of the universalistic 
Swedish welfare state. In a country with an enduring legacy 
of state-level racism, federally-administered cash benefits are 
likely to be distributed in a more egalitarian way than direct 
public provision, which is always locally implemented. It 
is more consistent with our liberal, individualistic political 
culture—and would at the same time be more disruptive to 
our enduring system of racial and economic segregation—to 
provide lower income Americans (a disproportionate number 
of whom are African-Americans and Latinos) with the means 
to move to schools, cities, and industries through which they 
can escape the ghettos to which their reliance on public housing 
and locally-administered benefits confines them.
To move on to the second question, an advantage the U.S. 
has over Sweden is that, like countries that skipped laying 
copper phone lines and went straight to cell phones, the U.S. 
can go straight to the problem of capital concentration without 
going through the step of setting up a comprehensive employ-
ment-based welfare state. Piketty's data on increasing inequal-
ity in the U.S. and Europe since the 1970s makes a strong case 
that economic inequality can only be durably reduced through 
redistribution of income, wealth, and bequests, and not 
through full-employment and the socialization of consump-
tion alone (Piketty, 2014). True and enduring economic equal-
ity will require the redistribution of capital as well as income 
and benefits in kind, either through the socialization of capital 
through public ownership, or through a system of universal 
dividends. A universal, unconditional, and individual basic 
income is not the only way to provide citizens with econom-
ic security, but in the American context, with our particular 
social, political, and economic history, it seems likelier than 
the successful implementation of a comprehensive, solidaris-
tic, and universalistic welfare state like Sweden's. 
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Endnotes:
1. None of the Nordic states has a population larger than 10 million.
2. At least two-thirds of the population of each of the Nordic nations 
is Lutheran, and Lutheranism remains the state church in Denmark, 
Norway, and Iceland. Lutheranism was Sweden’s state religion 
until 2000. Finland has two state churches, Lutheranism and Finnish 
Orthodox Christianity, but the latter accounts for only 1% of the 
population.
3. The pension system was initially designed to be financed by con-
tributions, rather than taxes, but it evolved into a generous tax-fi-
nanced, universal basic pension with an income-based supplement 
in the interwar and post-WWII period (Kaufmann, 2013, pp. 129-31).
4. The Labor Market Board, the Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, or AMS, 
was apparently nicknamed Alla Måste Söderut—“everyone must 
go south”—reflecting its mandate of encouraging labor mobility to 
achieve full employment (Hilson, 2008, p. 70).
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5. The Rehn-Meidner model included stimulation of public savings 
and direct public investment, along with a liberal trade policy, in ad-
dition to the policies noted above (Hilson, 2008, chap. 2).
6. Women dominate (with over 80% of the positions) in the caring 
professions, schooling, and secretarial work. Sweden’s high level 
of occupational segregation along gender lines suggests a qualifi-
cation of its reputation as a strongly gender egalitarian nation. See 
Estévez-Abe (2006) for a discussion of occupational segregation in 
Scandinavian countries with gender-egalitarian norms and high 
female labor-force participation rates.
7. According to Standing (1988, pp. 139-44), a broader social divi-
dend was considered and rejected during the period of discussion 
about Wage Earner Funds, but I have found no other discussion of a 
possible social dividend, or basic income, in my research.
8. TCO (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation), the professional em-
ployee’s union confederation, never participated in centralized bar-
gaining at all, and the expansion of the public sector in the 1970s and 
1980s increasingly made government, rather than LO and SAF, the 
effective wage setter in the labor market as a whole.
9. Sweden, like Britain and France, saw a decline in the rate of in-
equality of wealth in the 60 years between 1910 and 1970, but it has 
been rising in Britain and Sweden since the 1980s, and in France since 
the 1990s.
10. Union membership in the U.S. peaked at 35% of non-agricultural 
employees in the 1940s, and currently stands at about 11%. (Mayer, 
2004). In contrast, Sweden had a level of union membership of almost 
50% in 1907, and the rate peaked at over 80% in the 1990s (Tsarouhas, 
2008, pp. 40-41; Hilson, 2008, table 5).
11. Social Security is also a progressive program, paying higher ben-
efits to lower income recipients than to higher income recipients, in 
relation to contributions paid over their work lives. 
Sept.2016.indd   96 8/5/16   1:06 PM
